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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
willing to reason by analogy in its advocacy of the third party beneficiary doctrine,
but the whole tenor of the opinion suggests the Court is proceeding under the
last mentioned analysis. It is faced with a situation which is not covered directly
by the statute and would not be maintainable at common law and hence both
statute and common law are evaluated. The fact that the Court does attempt to
create a third party beneficiary, however, seems to indicate that the statute as it
stands is still limited in scope. Thus, the Court exercises a process of judicial
evaluation of prior decisions in the common law tradition.
Theoretically, in a given factual situation, the courts are precluded from
judicial manipulations by predetermined judicial decisions. However, factual
situations are rarely identical and subjectivity, tempered by considerations of
judicial and public policy, may lead a court to adhere to precedent on one hand
or distinguish on the other. There are times when the exigencies of the situation
will lead the court to re-examine the validity of prior distinctions and question
them in the light of further experience. This, it appears, is the evaluating process
the Court has used in this case in finding the precedent cases, in the light of
resulting experience, resulting in manifest injustice by their insistence on a rule
which at best has tenuous foundations in logic.
It is submitted that the inaction of the legislature regarding the proposed
statutory amendment is of little significance. The statutory remedy as it stood
was insufficient in this instance, not because of legislative inaction, but because of
court-made precedents. It is a legitimate function of the courts to re-evaluate
these precedents and extend the statutory remedy by analogy when the purchase
is made for the benefit of another.
Joseph Shramek
Newspaper Reporter's Confidential Sources of Information-
Are They Constitutionally Protected?
Judy Garland commenced a libel suit gainst the Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. based upon statements made in Maria Torre's newspaper column
allegedly based upon information from a C.B.S. executive. The plaintiff's counsel
took Miss Torre's deposition' in which she admitted that the statements in her
column were based upon information given her by a C.B.S. "network executive,"
but refused to disclose the identity of her informant. The case of Garland v. Torrc
2
affirmed Torre's contempt conviction for her refusal to disclose her "confidential"
news source.
1. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
2. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).
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The defendant's contentions presented a problem as to the constitutionality
and evidentiary propriety of compelling an individual to testify as to matters
relevant and essential3 to a proper adjudication of pending litigation when the
production of such information would have the effect of limiting news sources
by placing informants in apprehension of discovery. The defendant's specific
claims were that "to compel newspaper reporters to disclose confidential sources
of news would ... encroach upon the freedom of the press as guaranteed by the
First Amendment, because it would impose an important practical restraint upon
the flow of news from news sources to news media and would thus diminish
pro tanto the flow of news to the public";4 and, in the absence of constitutional
protection, she asserted that "the social interest in assuring a free and unrestricted
flow of news to the public should impel this court to hold that the identity of
confidential news sources should be protected by at least a qualified privilege.";-
The court clearly indicated its cognizance of the problem created by the doctrine
of Erie v. TompkinsO as to which law, state or federal, shall determine the meaning
of "privileged" as used in Rule 26(b) of the Federal ules of Civil Procedure and
its resulting limitations on the scope of inquiry.7 However, the court stated
that neither federal8 nor state (New York) 9 rules of evidence recognized the
privilege claimed, and it refused to create such a privilege (assuming that the
court had the power to do so).
The constitutional question presented appears to be on e of first impression
and the opinion by Judge Stewart, former Circuit Judge, and presently a Justice
of the United States Supreme Court, relied on the cases of Bridges v. California,10
Peniekamp v. Florida," and Craig v. Harneyx2 as having established that if the
exercise of freedom of the press directly impedes the function of the judicial
process, the press must yield. Each of these cases dealt with contempt convictions,
of members of the pFess for publications containing prejudicial comments on
pending litigation which, the lower courts had determined, obstructed the orderly
administration of justice. On review the Supreme Court reversed each of these
3. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 499 (1958).
4. 259 F.2d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1958).
5. Id. at 548.
6. 304 U.S. 64 (1958).
7. Compare Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469, 470 (2d Cir. 1955);
Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603, 607-8 (7th Cir. 1955); Munner v. Swedish Amer-
ican Lines, 35 F.Supp. 493, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Reeves v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
8 F.R.D. 816 (D. Del. 1949); with Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co.,
15 F.R.D. 55, 57 (N.D.O. 1953); Ex parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Ala.
1953); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 N.S. 495 (1957). See Greene, The Admissibility
of Evidence under the Federal Rules, 55 HAmv. L. R. 197 (1941).
8. See Brewster v. Boston-Hearld-Traveler, 20 F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957);
Rosenburg v. Carroll, 99 F.Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Clein v. State, 52 So.2d
117 (Fla. 1950); Pinkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911).
9. See People v. Sheriff of N.Y. County, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936).
10. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
11. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
12. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
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convictions. These Supreme Court opinions advanced different tests, standards and
criteria to determine whether the defendant's actions were such as to justify a
contempt conviction and the resulting abridgment of the freedom of the press.
As sta,'ed by Justice Reed, "whether the threat to the impartial and orderly
administration of justice must be a clear and present danger or a grave and
immediate danger, a real and substantial threat, one which is close and direct or
one which disturbs the court's sense of fairness depends upon a choice of words.
Under any one of the phrases, reviewi ag courts are brought in cases of this type
to appraise the comment on a balance between the desirability of the free discussion
and the necessity for fair adjudication, free from interruption in its processes."13
In each of the cases relied upon, the judges looked to several factors to
determine what effect the publication had upon the judicial proceedings. They
looked to the content of the publication to see if it was more than a reporting of
what transpired in a courtroom to determine whether it appealed for a particular
decision in a pending case. They considered the circulation of the publication to
determine the degree of likelihood that such publication would come to the
attention of the individuals, who, acting on behalf of the court, would make a
final decision and whether the circulation was sufficient to bring public pressure
to bear upon such persons. They also looked to the stage of proceeding to deter-
mine whether the persons charged with the duty of making such determination
were such as to be swayed by such a publication and its effect upon public opinion,
generally indicating that such publications are more capable of influencing a jury
decision than the decision of an experienced judge. This type of inquiry might be
viewed as an application of the clear and present danger test; and each of the
three decisions advances such a test at some point.14 However, the present day
status, value, and merit of the clear and present danger test is difficult to deter-
mine.15 Regardless of what label shall be affixed to the criteria used in any of
these decisions, the court attempted to determine whether the defendant's actions
did impede the orderly administration of justice and whether the interests in a free
press were outweighed by the interests in the judicial process.
Judge Stewart's extension of the rationale of the Bridges, Pennekamp, and
Craig cases to the Torre case did not expressly state the criteria used to balance
the interests in support of the conclusion which subordinates freedom of the press
to the proper function of the judicial process. The court reasoned that these
decisions established the proposition that if the exercise of freedom of the press
directly impedes the function of the judical process, the press must yield, and the
court impliedly concluded that judicial inquiry into a witness's knowledge is such
an essential and long recognized right as to be essential to the orderly admin-
13. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 336 (1946).
14. See Comment, 17 U. CHi. L. R. 540 (1950).
15. See Dennis v. U.S. 341 U.S. 949 (1951) and Maryland v. Baltimore
Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
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istration of justice.16 There can be no doubt that the judicial process is impeded
by the withholding of relevant information, but it is submitted that the rationale
of the prior decisions would require an analysis of additional factors.
In the prior cases it should be recognized that the abridgment of the freedom
of the press was a direct abridgment in that it punished individuals for their
publications. However, the scope of such an abridgment was quite limited in that
it only prevented a particular type of publication at a particular time. After a
final adjudication of the case, the press is at liberty to comment upon and dis-
approve of the proceedings or the decision.lT The type of abridgment involved in
the Torre case is at most indirect in that it does not prevent or punish action of
the press, but merely discourages informants from supplying the press with fact.
However, the scope of such an abridgment is much wider in that it does not
merely postpone publications of a particular type, but discourages publications
of any type where the informant wishes to remain anonymous. The court did not
indicate that the confidential news sources of a reporter attempting to disclose
public graft, gambling and vice, subversion, treason or any other matter of public
concern would receive any more prdtection than is provided for a gossip
columnist's news sources. The social interests in a free press would vary depending
upon the type of news reported and what it 'was intended to accomplish. Further-
more, it is submitted that valid distinctions exist as to the weight to be given the
interests of society in the administration of justice depending upon the nature of
the particular case involved; that is to say, the interests of society may be greater
in a criminal prosecution involving a major crime than they would be for a
minor offense, and social interest in a civil suit may be greater if damages
could only be recovered from the informant and not from the reported.
Although the court's decision did not discuss the aforementioned problems,
nor indicate its awareness of them, it is submitted that the court's decision was
correct in this case. Although the social interest in a private libel suit may be
slight, it is of sufficient interest to outweigh any social interest which may exist
in a gossip column that has no other purpose than to provide "interesting"
reading matter. However, the balancing of interests between particular types of
news and public services performed by the press may outweigh the public interest
in some types of judicial inquiries. A detailed consideration of these interests
might form the basis for future distinctions between the Torre case .and future
problems of a similar -nature. These same considerations may also form a basis
for legislative action in this area.' 8
Roger E. Pyle
16. See 8 WIMoaR, EVIDENCE 2192 (3d Ed. 1940).
17. Supra note 14.
18. See NEw YORK LAw REVISION CoMMIsSIoN, REPORT 23-168 (1949).
